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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1956
be brought into the court room and that which cannot, merely because
the latter cannot be included in the record on an appeal. Much other
evidence is not included in the record such as demeanor of witnesses,
physical demonstrations, etc. Where the parties are given an opportu-
nity to be present and a proper method of showing the material facts
to be observed is employed in the way of a safeguard to a fair trial,
there would seem little justification for a rule as limiting as that
announced by the Elston case. A revaluation of the Elston rule by the
supreme court of the extent to which a view may be used in support
of the trial court's findings seems to be needed. Relaxation of the
strict rule would be helpful to counsel especially in cases involving
subject matter which is difficult to describe adequately by testimony,
and also to the trial judge who may be confused by the supposedly
descriptive testimony of a witness. It is submitted that the court
should adopt a rule whereby a trial judge may utilize what he has
seen upon his view as additional evidence in the case. In the two
cases reported, the court seems to be moving in this direction.
JOHN D. LAWSON
Timeliness of Affidavit of Prejudice-Rulings Involving Discretion-Granting
Permission for Out of State Attorney to Become Associated with an Attorney of
Record. In re William'ns Estate, 48 Wn2d 313, 293 P.2d 392 (1956), involved an
application for a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial judge from presiding over
a will contest in disregard of an affidavit of prejudice. Prior to the filing of the
affidavit of prejudice, the trial judge had granted an oral application allowing
an out-of-state attorney to become associated with the relator for the trial of the
cause. Held: RCW 4.12.050 requires that the affidavit of prejudice be filed and
brought to the attention of the trial judge "before the judge presiding has made any
order or ruling involving discretion." The granting of the oral application was a ruling
involving discretion within the meaning of RCW 4.12.050, and as such the affidavit
of prejudice was not filed timely under the statute even though the ruling did not
go to the merits of the case. The court also said that it was immaterial that under
Rule 22, Revised Rules for Admission to Practice, 34A Wn2d, May 1955, Supp. p. 36
(now Rule 7, Rules for Admission to Practice, 47 Wn2d p. xxvi (1956)), the
judge was required to give his reasons for refusal or that the application is usually
granted as a matter of comity and courtesy, since this would only have a bearing
upon whether there was an abuse of discretion in rejecting the application.
PROBATE
Parties Entitled to Appointment as Administrators-Grounds for
Disqualification. The Washington Court recently handed down two
decisions which appear to alter the existing principles relating to the
qualification and disqualification of parties entitled to be appointed as
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administrators. In re McGill's Estate' held that inexperience in business
affairs was not a sufficient reason to deprive a surviving spouse of the
priority right to administer her husband's estate as provided by RCW
11.28.120.2 In the case of In re Odman's Estate3 the court held that a
serious physical handicap and a factual basis for the existence of a
controversy between the surviving spouse and the estate were not suf-
ficient grounds to deprive her of the right to administer the community
portion of the estate pursuant to RCW 11.28.030.1
There does not appear to be any sound reason for taking issue with
the results reached by the court in either of these cases.' However, the
broad legal principle set forth by the court as the basis for the de-
cisions represents a substantial change in fundamental policy. In reach-
ing its decision in the Odman case the court stated,
... in In re McGill's Estate we indicated that the right of the surviving
spouse is absolute except when (1) such surviving spouse is disqualified
on one of the statutory grounds, or (2) it is evident that he or she
would do irreparable harm to the estate if appointed.6
In In re McGill's Estate the court stated that RCW 11.36.010' pre-
scribes the grounds for disqualifying an administrator, implying that
these grounds were exclusive.
Three Washington statutes directly deal with the right to be ap-
1 149 Wash. Dec. 233, 299 P.2d 847 (1956). The court upheld the appointment of
the decedent's wife as administratrix over the objection raised by other heirs that she
lacked the necessary qualifications because of her inexperience in the extensive busi-
ness matters that were involved. The court pointed out that the survivor need not
manage the business enterprises personally and that none of the statutory grounds
for disqualification applied.
2 RCW 11.28.120. "Persons entitled to letters. Administration of the estate of the
person dying intestate shall be granted to some one or more of the persons hereinafter
mentioned, and they shall be respectively entitled in the following order: (1) The
surviving husband or wife... "
8 149 Wash. Dec. 583, 304 P.2d 1044 (1956). The court upheld the appointment
of the decedent's wife as administratrix of the community portion of the estate over
the objection raised by the executor that the confinement to a wheel chair, a pro-
nounced speech impediment and the existence of a factual basis for a dispute over the
nature of the deceased's property as community or separate were grounds for dis-
qualification at the discretion of the trial court.
4RCW 11.28.030. "Community property-Who entitled to letters. A surviving
spouse shall be entitled to administer upon the community property, notwithstanding
any provisions of the will to the contrary, if the court find such spouse to be otherwise
qualified . . . "
5 In connection with physical handicaps as grounds for disqualification see: In re
Holland's Estate, 139 N.Y.S2d 63, Sur. 1955. Robinson v. Robinson, 178 Md. 623,
16 A.2d 854 (1940) ; Mobley v. Mobley, 149 Md. 401, 131 Atl. 770 (1926) ; 158 A.L.R.
296 (1945).
6149 Wash. Dec. at 585, 304 P2d at 1045 (1956).
7RCW 11.36.010. "Parties disqualified. The following persons are not qualified to
act as executors or administrators: Corporations, nonresidents of this state, minors,
persons of unsound mind, or who have been convicted of any felony or a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude. .. ."
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pointed administrator or executor of an estate. The decision in the
McGill case is based on RCW 11.28.120 which deals with adminis-
trators of intestate estates. RCW 11.28.0108 deals with letters to
executors, while In re Odman is based on RCW 11.28.030 which pro-
vides for the administration of the community estate by the surviving
spouse. It should be noted that no clear distinction has ever been
drawn in Washington on the basis of the language of these statutes.
RCW 11.28.010 and RCW 11.28.120 are phrased in the generally
recognized mandatory or absolute language of "shall be granted."9
This language would seem to lead to the conclusion that persons
eligible under these two statutes have an absolute right, except as
qualified by RCW 11.36.010, the disqualification statute. RCW
11.28.030, the community property statute, presents a different situa-
tion however. This statute begins in absolute terms but contains the
qualifying clause, "if the court finds such spouse to be otherwise
qualified." This latter provision would seem to grant the court dis-
cretion, for the purpose of insuring the proper administration of the
community estate, in judging the qualifications of a surviving spouse
to serve as administrator.
While a distinction can be drawn on the basis of the different lan-
guage of the statutes it does not appear that the court has even con-
sidered it in so far as the qualifications of administrators are concerned.
This uniform treatment is demonstrated in the two cases under con-
sideration, the McGill case, dealing with a survivor's right under the
intestate statute, being cited as the controlling authority for In re
Odman, concerning the surviving spouse's right under the community
property statute. A distinction has developed in the case of executors,
however, the court taking the position that it is decidedly limited in its
discretion to disqualify executors.
An examination of earlier Washington decisions in this area indicates
that the court was previously disposed to exercise a rather wide dis-
cretion in passing upon the qualifications of parties applying for ap-
pointment as administrators. The cases dealing with the qualifications
of executors, on the other hand, have limited the court's power of
disqualification almost to a point where the statutory right has become
absolute except as qualified by the statutory grounds for disqualifica-
8 RCW 1128.010. "Letters to executors-Refusal to serve-Disqualification. After
probate of any will, letters testamentary shall be granted to the persons therein
appointed executors ... "
0 See 39 Voas &ND PHRASES 122, Shall-In Statutes As Permissive Or Mandatory.
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tion. The previous decisions can be divided into three groups based
on the particular state involved.
In re Robinson's Estate10 and State ex rel Lauridsen v. Superior
Court" are representative of the position regarding the court's dis-
cretionary power to set aside the appointment of an executor nominated
by the testator in his will. The court in the Robinson case refused to
name as co-executor a petitioner who had attempted to suppress the
will, stating that while great respect would be given to the nomination
of the testator, the court is not bound or concluded by it. In the
Lauridsen case the court took a more positive position in upholding
the right of executors, stating,
... in the absence of fraud connected with the will or the estate, and in
absence of any statutory disqualification, the right of the testator to
appoint an executor of his will may not be superseded by the court by
appointing an administrator in his place.' 2
These decisions appear to establish the principle that in the absence
of some element of fraud the right of an executor to administer the
estate is absolute so long as none of the statutory grounds for dis-
qualification are applicable.
The cases dealing with the qualifications of persons seeking appoint-
ment as administrators under the intestate statute have set forth
principles which appear to give the court greater discretion than is
afforded where executors are involved. Beginning with In re Langilt's
Estate" the court has consistently taken the position that the right
to appointment as administrator is not absolute nor are the statutory
grounds for disqualifying persons entitled to serve exclusive. The
previous cases have generally taken the position that while great
weight is to be accorded the statutory preferences the court may
exercise its discretion in judging the qualifications of parties seeking
appointment as administrators. 4 In In re Stotts' Estate", the court
stated:
10 149 Wash. 307, 270 Pac. 1020 (1928).
31179 Wash. 198, 37 P.2d 209 (1934). The court upheld the rights of executors
to administer the estate by revoking letters of administration which had previously
been issued when the executors had unavoidably delayed appearing.12 179 Wash. at 207, 37 P2d at 212 (1934).
's 117 Wash. 268, 201 Pac. 28 (1921). The child of the deceased, applying pur-
suant to RCW 11.28.120, was denied appointment as administrator because of a prior
misappropriation of the estate. None of the statutory grounds for disqualification were
applicable.
"4 State ex rel Cowley v. Superior Court, 158 Wash. 546, 291 Pac. 481 (1930);
In re Thomas' Estate, 167 Wash. 127, 8 P.2d 963 (1932) ; In re St. Martin's Estate,
175 Wash. 285, 27 P.2d 326 (1933) ; In re Covington's Estate, 177 Wash. 668, 33 P.2d
87 (1934), In re Leith's Estate, 42 Wn.2d 223, 254 P.2d 490 (1953).
[SumVPF.?
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The relation is such that he who serves as administrator should be one
who can act impartially, and in those jurisdictions such as this where
the court is not bound by mandatory statutory provisions on the subject
of preference right of appointment, nor by enumerated causes of dis-
qualification to act, no one should be appointed who is hostile to the
observance of and respect for the rule that the purpose of administration
is to both collect and preserve the estate and impartially assist in passing
it to those beneficially interested according to the priority of their
rights.'6
This position seems far removed from that taken in the Odman and
McGill decisions.
Only one prior case appears to have dealt specifically with the
power of the court to evaluate the qualifications of a person applying
for appointment as administrator under the community property
statute. The court in the case of In re Bredl's Estate" said that the
preference rights given by the statute were valuable but not absolute.
The principle set forth was that the statutory right is not so definite
that it requires the appointment of one who has demonstrated a dis-
honesty of purpose or one who portrays a gross unfitness in other
respects to administer the trust.
Prior to In re McGill and In re Odman it appeared that Washington
had departed from the majority rule to the effect that the statutory
grounds of disqualification are exclusive, at least in the cases of
administrators. Persons applying under the intestate and community
property statutes have been denied appointment on the grounds of
fraud, misappropriation of the estate, hostility to creditors and where
bitterness and ill feeling existed between persons equally entitled to
serve.'" It appeared firmly established that the statutory rights were
not absolute and that the courts should exercise discretion in deter-
mining whether an applicant was qualified for appointment as admin-
istrator. The principles adopted in In re McGill and In re Odman
now place Washington, for all practical purposes, with the majority
of the jurisdictions which have held that the statutory grounds for
disqualification are exclusive.'
15 133 Wash. 100, 233 Pac. 280 (1925). The court denied the petition for appoint-
ment of the guardian of two minor grandchildren of the deceased and appointed instead
a disinterested party because the petitioner had demonstrated hostility towards claims
of creditors.
213 133 Wash. at 104, 233 Pac. at 282 (1925).
1 117 Wash. 372, 201 Pac. 280 (1921). The court denied appointment of the
husband of the deceased who was applying under RCW 11.28.030 where he had
previously concealed facts concerning the existence of a will.
18 See note 14 supra.
'1921 Am. JuR., Executors and Administrators § 82 (1939); 33 C.J.S., Executors
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If the court elects in the future to stand on the proposition that
the statutory right to serve as an administrator or executor is absolute
except as qualified by the disqualification statute, or where it is
evident that irreparable harm would be done to the estate, Washington
law appears to be in an anomalous position. RCW 11.28.250,20
providing for the revocation of letters, states that when the court
has reason to believe that an administrator or executor is incompetent
to act, or for any other cause or reason which appears necessary, it
shall have the authority to revoke such letters. 1 It seems incongruous
that the court apparently is empowered with a much wider discretion
to remove administrators or executors than it has to deny their original
appointment. Consistency would appear to require that the court have
the authority to exercise the same sound discretion in weighing the
qualifications before appointment that is exercises in removing
administrators after appointment. As indicated previously, the deci-
sions prior to McGill and Odman provide established authority for
such a position, at least in the case of administrators.
JosEPHr D. HoLmEs, JR.
Executors and Administrators-Venue. Schluneger vs. Seattle-First National Bank,
48 Wn.2d 188, 292 P2d 203 (1956) presented the question whether an action on a
rejected claim in probate may be maintained against a corporate executor in the
county wherein it transacts business, but other than the county in which it was
appointed executor.
Defendant bank was appointed executor by the Superior Court of Whitman County.
Plaintiffs served a creditor's claim upon the defendant and filed it with the clerk
of the Superior Court within the statutory period. The claim was rejected by
the defendant. In accordance with RCW 11.40.060 (Suit on Rejected Claim) plaintiffs
commenced an action on the rejected claim in Spokane County wherein the defendant
transacted business. The defendant appeared specially, challenging the jurisdiction
of the Spokane Superior Court. The Spokane court refused to dismiss but transferred
the action to Whitman County. The defendant again made a special appearance and
demurred upon the ground that the action had not been commenced within the statutory
period.
In reversing a dismissal of the plaintiffs' action the Supreme Court ruled that under
RCW 11.16.070 a distinction exists between probate matters and a civil action to
establish a rejected claim as a charge against an estate. A civil action is not part of
the probate proceedings and is governed by the same venue rules like any other civil
and Administrators § 34 (1942).
20 RCW 1128.250. "Revocation of letters-Causes. Whenever the court has reason
to believe that any executor or administrator has wasted, embezzled, or mismanaged,
or is about to waste, or embezzle the property of the estate committed to his charge,
or has committed, or is about to commit a fraud upon the estate, or is incompetent to
act, or is permanently removed from the state, or has wrongfully neglected the estate,
or has neglected to perform any acts as such executor or administrator, or for any
other cause or reason which to the court appears necessary, it shall have power and
authority, after citation and hearing to revoke such letters ...21 In re Clawson's Estate, 3 Wn2d 509, 101 P.2d 968 (1940).
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action. Once a rejected claim is established in the proper court, it then becomes
subject to the rules of estate administration. Following Rule of Pleading, Practice
and Procedure 1, 34A Wn.2d 68, the action (against the corporate defendant) was
properly commenced in Spokane County wherein the corporate executor "transacts
business."
Heirs and Next of Kin-Stepchildren. In the case of In re Smith's Estate, 149
Wash. Dec. 217, 299 P.2d 550 (1956) the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision that stepchildren cannot take as "issue"' or "children" under the Washington
statute of descent. The statute, RCW 11.04.020, provides in so far as here relevent:
"If the decedent leaves no husband or wife the estate goes in equal shares to his children,
and to the issue of any deceased child by right of representation" ... "the words 'issue,'
'child' and 'children' whenever used in this section shall be construed to include law-
fully adopted children." RCW 11.04.100 prohibits distinctions between kindred of the
whole blood and of the half blood who are entitled to inherit under the statutes of
descent and distribution. As between a stepchild and stepparent there is no blood
relationship, but only the relationship of affinity which is the relationship one spouse
has to blood relatives of the other spouse. Here there was no showing that the decedent
adopted plaintiffs and since there was no blood relationship between decedent and
plaintiffs, they cannot inherit as heirs at law.
Unsuccessful Bidders at Realty Sale-Right to Appeal. In re Scholes' Estate, 149
Wash. Dec. 319, 301 P2d 172 (1956) held that the unsuccessful bidder at a probate sale
was not an "interested party" entitled to appeal to the supreme court. Plaintiffs put in
a bid for the real estate, then withdrew it and entered a new bid. Before learning of
the new bid, the administratrix had accepted a bid which was for ten dollars less than
plaintiffs' final bid. Not knowing of plaintiffs' new bid, a return of sale on the lower
bid was made by the administratix. Plaintiffs appealed from an order confirming an
amended return of sale to the lower bidder. In affirming, the court first held that it
was within the discretion of the trial court to approve the lower price when the
difference was only ten dollars. As a second independent ground for the decision, the
court held that the appellant was not an "interested" party. In support of this the
court cited the case of Terry v. Clothier, 1 Wash. 475, 25 Pac. 673 (1890). The case
held that unsuccessful bidders are not interested parties and have no right to object to a
confirmation of sale. Under RCW 11.16.040 the plaintiffs were not interested parties
as their only concern was to purchase property from the estate. An "interested" party
is one such as a personal representative, who represents the estate, or an heir, legatee,
devisee or creditor who can claim a right to receive something from the estate. The
statute does not give the plaintiffs, situated as they are, the right to appeal.
REAL PROPERTY
Conveyance of After-Acquired Title by Quitclaim Deed; Effect
of Habendum Clause. The court, in Brenner v. Brenner Oyster Co.'
held the presence of an habendum clause in a quitclaim deed does not
show an intention to convey after-acquired title within the provisions
of RCW 64.04.070. In so holding, the court expressly overruled West
Seattle Land and Improvement Co. v. Novelty Mill Co., and Bradley
148 Wn.2d 264, 292 P2d 1052 (1956).
231 Wash. 435, 72 Pac. 69 (1903).
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